

**9<sup>th</sup> MSC:**

1. Do you have concerns regarding your capability to generate ready Army forces?

a. If yes what are the specific areas of risk.

- Demand/Requirements in an Complex Environment IOT assist and support USPACOM and USARPAC ensure and maintain theater-wide security and stability, and if necessary, provide ready and responsive USAR capabilities to deter aggressive actions/actors that threaten regional security.
- Costs to maintain increased ability to support the establishment, maintenance and sustainment of additional capabilities required by the AC to ensure regional security and stability.
- The lack of available funding to respond to USARPAC demand/requirements IOT support achieving stability and security in the Complex Pacific Environment.
- The lack of available funding for sufficient whole-unit participation in habitual exercises, security cooperation partnership events (host nation capacity dependent)
- Limited potency of USERRA in the event a USAR Soldier is activated for a *voluntary* mobilization that exceeds 29 days of Annual Training, e.g., Pacific Pathways for three months.
- Accessing ready Army Reserve forces from recruitment varies by location across the Pacific.
- Risk of alienating employers who thought the Reserves only served one weekend a month and two weeks a year, and families who may have varying difficulties with a family member away for an extended period of time.
- Getting the right force structure mix, e.g., Theater Sustainment, Theater Opening, to support ASCC and GCC requirements
- Title 10 Requirements
  - Man – recruit with incentives
  - Sustain – Target Bonus
  - Train – Funding that supports AR training strategies
  - Equip – Proper equipment sets
- Net/Sustain funding
- Proper FTS
  - Directed care for force
  - SHARP
  - Unit Administrators
  - Training
  - Support
  - Maintenance
- Rapid Mobilization/Mobilization-In-Place of forward deployed units in Korea/Japan

b. How do you use your forces and how do you maintain their readiness (funding, authorities, access, and command relationships)?

- We balance the AR training strategy against Pacific requirements
  - Supports readiness and employment of capabilities
  - Use of ARFORGEN cycle for 1:5 readiness for deployment model.
  - Funding is allocated for annual training and readiness events ICW a commander's annual training plan. As the unit approaches the ready year, additional funding may be allocated, either by 9<sup>th</sup> MSC or USARC to ensure the unit fully completes training and readiness milestones.
  - In normal operations, annual training funding is used. IOT support emerging, no- and short-notice events (disaster or CCMD or ASCC directed) and ensure accessibility to the AC, we draw a portion of a unit (or capability) on annual training funding. For example, a unit could be tasked to respond to a hurricane landfall on US territory. Mobilization authority is through USC 12304(a), but no Federal reimbursement if there is no Presidential Declaration for emergency or disaster.
  - Similar situation with HADR. If the host nation does not request aid from DoS/USAID/OFDA, responding USAR unit will not be reimbursed under USAID statutes.
  - If the USAR responds to the AC's asking/tasking for support and 12304(b) is not available due to a 2-year RFF Funding forecast, is there recourse to simply using annual training/unit base funding? This serves only to decrement to overall unit's ability to complete its annual training plan unless the emergency call up fulfills one or more of its collective tasks or METLs.
- c. Do you have concerns about access to CONUS-based capabilities?
- No. Although we are a large USAR Command (> 3,100 Soldiers) with diverse support and sustainment capabilities, we may not always have what is required to fully support immediate or iterative demand signals from the CCMD and ASCC.
  - If we require additional capabilities, we maintain a close coordination with the USARPAC AREC and subordinate ARETs. The AREC/Ts support the Army RAF concept IOT provide the CCDR versatile, tailored, responsive and consistently available USAR capabilities for planned and emerging missions.
  - Reach-back capability to Regionally Aligned Forces IAW GEF and GFMIG.
  - In the event, the 9<sup>th</sup> MSC requires augmentation for a CCDR/ASCC mission, the AREC assists us by requesting COCOM capabilities through FORSCOM and USARC.
- d. Loss of what capability would cause you the most concern? Why?
- Sustainment, specifically our Logistics Support Vessel (LSV-7) and its crew, which represents 1/3 of this capability in theater. The 8<sup>th</sup> Theater Support Command (TSC) has the other two LSVs. We have an AC-RC relationship with the 8<sup>th</sup> TSC, also a Theater Enabling Command subordinate to USARPAC. On an annual basis, the 8<sup>th</sup> TSC request this capability for a myriad of missions that, if full funded could extend out to 100+ days of AD per year. Further, AC forecasting for RC capabilities in the FY17-21 timeframe



would like to have the LSV-7 on almost continues AD for up to three years in the future.

- The greatest deficit for the LSV-7 is a full-time crew. Ideally, a next best solution is two crews, mixed between part- and full-time Reservists, as well as a maintenance team that could work with the Navy on JBPHH to sustain the LSV-7's readiness and support the other two AC LSVs.
- Losing any of the following capabilities would significantly decrement the 9<sup>th</sup> MSC's ability to support USARPAC/USPACOM:
  - Medical
  - Engineer
  - Civil Affairs
  - Military Police
  - Infantry
- **Demand Signal from AC includes, but not limited to:**
  - Transportation Theater Opening Elements (2-3)
  - Medium Truck Companies (10)
  - ROWPU Companies (2-3)
  - CBRNE for Foreign Consequence Management
  - HAST (1 RC to augment AC teams)
  - Sea-Basing and USAR Army Pre-Positioned Stock
  - USAR Aviation Capabilities (cargo/personnel transportation and mobility)
    - Beneficial for DSCA, HADR, Contingency operations

e. How have and will Army changes the size and force mix impact your region?

- As the Regular Army downsizes, it will continue to drop capabilities from its roles as well as reducing end strength.
- We are working with USARPAC to identify those capabilities needed for the Pacific via their SHAPE and POSTURE LOEs and noted WFF and HADR activity set shortfalls.
- This compliments Global capability requirements for –
  - Movement Control
  - Theater Opening and Sustainment
- Types of capabilities decremented in the Pacific will have direct relationship on how much and how often the 9<sup>th</sup> MSC and USAR in general may be asked or tasked to support ongoing and emerging CCMD and ASCC mission.
- Due to “tyranny of time and distance” geography of the Pacific, mobility and sustainment capabilities are necessary to move around the region and maintain readiness in case of an order to alert, assemble, activate and deploy.
- Ongoing and increasing need for disaster response capabilities, i.e., Engineer, Medical, Transportation, Quartermaster, Mortuary Affairs, Security and Sustainment.
- Increasing requirement to develop and sustain Security Cooperation partnership engagements also require most if not all of these same

capabilities for capacity and capability building, infrastructure repair and construction, etc.

2. How would you characterize risk when making trades between capacity, readiness, modernization, and interoperability?

- Readiness is big concern as to how to train on unique capabilities with limited training areas, e.g., Saipan and American Samoa and with limited training capabilities.
- Limited funding reduces allowable MEANS to support readiness training throughout a unit's ARFORGEN cycle. Reduced readiness affects the unit's ability to fulfill its set-the-theater or wartime missions and the capability(ies) it represents to a potential mission requirement.
- Greatest risk to fulfilling our Total Army requirement is resourcing/funding (MEANS) and trading readiness for interoperability.
- Capacity will be affected as a function of readiness.
- Modernization is not a significant factor at the moment as the 9<sup>th</sup> MSC is not slated for any significant modernization changes.

Does the term operational reserve have meaning for you? What reserve component capabilities need to be operational?

- 5,682 Army Reserve Soldiers are now supporting missions in the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) AOR, over 3,100 are assigned to the 9<sup>th</sup> MSC. Most recently, the Army Reserve supported the Nepal earthquake and Guam Typhoon disaster response.
- **Support LTG Talley's AR Recommendations:**
  - Sustain the Operational Reserve ILO utilizing the archaic Strategic Reserve individual augmentee mentality
  - An Operational Reserve functions best in the whole-unit training and readiness model and through a cyclic training process USAR offers the CCMD and ASCC predictable capabilities in any given FY.
  - Fully implements and supports the Army Total Force Policy, adjusting processes and procedures to better manage Active and Reserve Components as a Total Force. 9<sup>th</sup> MSC has numerous AC-RC training relationships IOT facilitate this concept.
  - USAR fully supports USPACOM and USARPAC with DSCA, Homeland Defense and Humanitarian Aid-Disaster Response.
- AR provides critical enabling capabilities that support *Set-The-Theater, Security Cooperation, Exercises, Contingency Operations and Warplans*, for example (**as it relates to the Pacific**) –
  - 94% of JAG
  - 80% of Chaplains
  - 77% of Civil Affairs



- 66% of Quartermaster
- 59% of Medical
- 43% of Transportation
- 30% of Engineers
- 24% of Military Police
- Use of 12304(a) in the Pacific:
  - DSCA and Homeland Defense
  - Hurricane/Typhoon pre-positioning and response
  - Earthquake/Tsunami response
  - Complex Catastrophe interoperability with DCO/East (Army) and West (Navy), State/Territory Emergency Management Offices, HING and GUNG
  - Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer activation/mobilization (HI, AS, GU/SAI)
- Use of 12304(b) in the Pacific:
  - Large-Scale Exercises in 14 of 36 Pacific nations; Bi-Lateral/Multi-Lateral Interoperability
  - Pacific Pathways 1-3 month “deployments”
  - SMEE, KLE/SLE, Exchanges with Foreign Partner Nations
  - Officer/NCO education and training exchange programs
  - Security Cooperation engagements with focus and emerging nations in North East Asia (JPN, ROK), South East Asia (SGP, IDN, MYS, PNG, PHL, KHY) and OCE (AUS, NZL, TON, New Caledonia [French Army])
  - AC-RC “Twinning” engagements and exercises
  - Joint Pacific Multi-National Readiness Capability with partner nations
  - Jungle Operations Training (Philippines?)
  - Arctic Training (Alaska)
- LTG Talley’s response to the NCFA: ILO utilizing the archaic Strategic Reserve individual augmentee mentality, an Operational Reserve functions best in the whole-unit training and readiness model where, through a cyclic training process, offers the CCMD and ASCC predictable capabilities in any given FY.
- Predictability helps Soldiers, Families and Employers understand when the Soldiers may be called away on active duty missions.
- Many of the support and sustainment capabilities in the whole Army reside in the USAR. If these capabilities are not prepared and ready for operational use, the entire Army suffers and risks mission failure.
- The USAR is a critical enabler of the Total Army Force initiative, but only if the USAR is allowed to train in a whole-unit environment, not as individual “fillers”.

3. With anticipated budgetary constraints, how would you leverage the strengths or mitigate the weaknesses of available capabilities (Reserve, Civilian workforce, contract personnel)?
  - USAR provides 20% of Total Army Forces out of only 6% of the total Army budget
  - USAR constrained by limited “activation” funding. Normally limited to 14 days AD time, this can be lengthened to 29 days.
  - In a protracted, emerging event, this can consume much if not all of the 29 days.
  - 9<sup>th</sup> MSC ICW the USARPAC AREC works with the AC commands for a multi-year, future-postured forecast for CCDR-supported missions using USC Code 12304(b) and the associated POM for funding. If the need is greater than what the 9<sup>th</sup> MSC has in-theater, the AREC calls for iterative capabilities from CONUS.
  - Short term: If an emerging event occurs where, currently, 12304(b) offers no reimbursement for a USAR call to AD, the 9<sup>th</sup> MSC can commit “emergency” forces (mostly people) within 48-72 hours in the form of FTUS AGR personnel.
  - More deliberate commitment of forces and materiel require additional effort and funding; if this occurs, discussion with USARPAC and USARC occur to determine alternate funding streams.
4. Do you have concerns about your ability to recruit sufficient prior active duty members to meet your strength goals? [appropriate grades, MOSQs, recruiters, resources, programs]
  - Targeted recruiting incentives that aim at our shortfalls as well as targeted retention bonuses.
  - With COMPO 1 losing approximately 18,500 Soldiers this year, some of these individuals do not wish to stop serving. Their exceptional skills and experience need not be lost.
  - USAR is an excellent option for a good number of AC Enlisted Soldiers, NCOs and Officers, especially via the AGR Program.
5. Do the demographics and ability to recruit in your state support your force structure distribution?
  - **HAWAII / ALASKA:** Adequate demographics to recruit and retain quality USAR Soldiers and Civilian employees (Mil-Techs).
  - **AMERICAN SAMOA:** issue is not an ability to recruit, but a limitation in available facility space in which to grow new units/capabilities. Due to the Matai chiefly culture, land is owned by the Chiefs within a village and cannot be sold or bought; only leased or rented. To that end, it may be possible to lease/rent additional land in the future to expand our USAR footprint. At that point, future recruitment and retention would likely continue to be successful.



- **GUAM:** Demographics also favor continued ability to gain and retain good, quality USAR Soldiers.
- **SAIPAN:** Demographics limit support to any significant growth, although a lower growth pattern could be supported, i.e., additional 1-2 Company level units.
- **JAPAN / KOREA:** Most of the uniformed and civilian personnel are resident in Hawaii and must fly to their units during weekend and annual training periods. A smaller proportion of the unit strengths are resident in the host nations. Active recruitment is non-existent however.

What are your unique concerns or considerations for force structure distribution?

- 9<sup>th</sup> MSC is forward-based and postured to have the ability to meet early theater opening and sustainment capabilities
- 9<sup>th</sup> MSC fosters GEN Brooks' priority of Rapid Mobilization/Mobilization-In-Place, and has developed a three-tier, modular response packaging (Emergency, Hasty, Deliberate) which is based on demand signal, time required and air/sea lift requirements as the deployment packages increase in scope and size.
- In looking to the future of the Pacific AOR, the USAR must be manned, equipped, resourced and funded to meet the ever-increasing demands of the Pacific Shift.
- The Pacific AOR is the most complex and volatile of the GCCs and USPACOM will shift to serve the two endstates of *Shaping The Theater* for regional security and stability through resilient international partnerships, and maintain a ready, flexible and sustainable force to deter aggression, rapidly respond and prevail against threats to stability.
- The 9<sup>th</sup> MSC has to be correctly structured and stationed to react quickly and efficiently to USPACOM and USARPAC.
- 9<sup>th</sup> MSC's primary support to USARPAC involves security cooperation engagements and posture/shape preparation to support the set-the-theater endstate.
- Additionally, we have been asked to support DSCA, HLD, and HADR missions throughout the Pacific AOR, especially in Hawaii and the Southeast Asia and Oceania sub-regions. This requires a re-alignment of "where" are primary capabilities are stationed versus where they currently reside.
- Ideally, some of our capabilities in Alaska should be re-positioned in Guam/Saipan where forward-positioning would be more advantageous. Better yet, adding more capabilities would be preferred but this, in turn, has its own issue with limited ground space in USAR facilities located in the Western Pacific.

6. What concerns do you have for the future of the Army?

Answer: